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Introduction 
Along with the deepening international economic and financial integration of recent 
decades, the 1990s saw a significant increase in foreign direct investment
1 (FDI) to 
developing countries. The upward trend reversed in 2002
2, following the global 
economic slowdown that started in 2001. But FDI flows to developing countries have  
recently picked up again, and continue to be the most important source of foreign 
financing in the developing world, by far outstripping inflows of official development 
assistance (ODA), and other types of private capital inflows such as portfolio capital 
inflows, bank deposits, etc. In comparison, the record of foreign direct investment in 
Arab countries is poor. Flows to the Arab world were modestly decreasing during the 
years of a general acceleration of FDI in the 1990s, stayed below flows to African 
countries relative to GDP during that entire period, and remain among the lowest in 
the developing world. 
 
FDI has come to be regarded as a means to achieve economic development in its own 
right, with expected positive spillovers over and above those associated with 
domestically financed investments. The pace of economic development in South Eash 
Asia in recent decades has for example often been attributed – at least in part – to 
openness to and inflows of foreign direct investment. On this background, it is 
important to ask whether or not Arab countries might be missing out, and should 
include financial incentives to attract FDI as part of a development strategy. 
Implementing costly financial incentives obviously only makes sense if the expected 
positive externalities associated with the particular type of FDI that the financial 
incentive is aimed at outweigh the cost of the incentive. However, while it is possible 
to make a relatively good estimate of the cost of a financial incentive, assessing and 
quantifying the potential positive externalities of FDI is problematic, at best. The 
findings of the empirical literature aiming at identifying the impact of FDI on growth 
mainly show that there is no universal answer to the question of how FDI impacts 
growth in its host country. The impact of FDI depends on a multitude of factors, such 
as the level of technology used in domestic production in the host country, the level of 
education of the host country workforce, the level of financial sector and institutional 
development, etc. All these factors and more contribute to whether the host country in 
question can “absorb” and hence benefit from FDI. And this multitude of factors is 
impossible to capture in a single economic model or regression analysis. The 
empirical literature on this topic is, moreover, in its infancy, and is thus fragmented 
and thin. But it has nevertheless led to some tentative conclusions, which can provide 
an overall framework for thinking about the benefits of FDI as a means to 
development, and which may prove useful information for the formulation of a 
general strategy with respect to foreign direct investment in Arab countries.  
 
The aim of this paper is to draw out the main conclusions from this nascent empirical 
literature, and, using selected measures of absorptive capacity for Arab countries, to 
evaluate what these conclusions imply for Arab countries, and hence whether these 
                                                 
1 Foreign investment is usually recorded as a direct investment when the foreign investor gains 10 
percent or more of the enterprise in which the investment is made.
 There are exceptions to this rule 
however. See UNCTAD (2002), page 301, note 1 
 
2 FDI flows between developed countries already significantly declined in 2001, following the global 
economic slump of that year.   3
countries should expect to be gaining from increased foreign direct investment 
inflows over and above other types of investment. As the analysis will show, the 
answer turns out to depend on the specific measure of absorptive capacity we look at, 
and which particular Arab country we are evaluating, but an overall conclusion can be 
made: It is far from certain, and not even likely, that the average Arab country is 
currently in a position to benefit more from increasing FDI inflows than from other 
types of investment. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
stylized facts regarding foreign direct investment in the Arab world. The empirical 
literature on the impact of FDI on host economies is evaluated in Section II with a 
view to its implications for Arab countries. Conclusions are drawn in the final 
Section. 
  
I.  The Stylized Facts for FDI in the Arab World 
Global FDI flows peaked in 2000, recording nearly USD 1.4 trillion of cross border 
FDI flows that year, but the volume of flows nearly halved in 2001 and 2002 
following the global economic slump that started in 2001. This negative trend slowed 
down in 2003 however, and global FDI flows are widely expected to have regained 
the positive momentum in 2004
3. The share of global FDI flows going to developing 
countries increased during the early and mid 1990s, but this trend was reversed with 
the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997. From 2000 onward, developing countries’ share 
in global FDI has been on the rise again. Meanwhile, FDI flows to Arab countries 
have followed a quite different pattern, which can be summarized by four stylized 
facts. 
 
Stylized fact 1: FDI flows to the Arab region are low relative to the region’s 
economic size 
The first stylized fact is that FDI inflows to Arab countries have been, and continue to 
be, poor in comparison with world and developing country inflows. The FDI inward 
performance index given in Table 1 is a summary measure of FDI inflows in percent 
of total world inflows, divided by the given country’s GDP in percent of gross world 
output. A value greater than one hence means that the region in question attracts more 
of the worlds total FDI flows than that regions share of world output. The table shows 
that the Arab (here reflected in West Asia and North Africa) regions have been 
attracting the least FDI relative to their economic size since the late 1980s. In fact, 
both North African countries and West Asian countries (which in addition to Arab 
countries also include Iran and Turkey) have the lowest FDI performance indices of 
the comparison regions, faring worse than the average African country, even worse 
than the average Sub Saharan African country
4. 
 
(Insert Table 1 around here) 
 
Stylized Fact 2: FDI inflows to Arab countries have declined relative to other 
developing countries since the early 1990s.  
                                                 
3 Source : UNCTAD, World Investment Reports, various years. 
4 This conclusion does not depend on the selection of comparison regions included in the table. If South 
Asia were included in the table as a separate region, this region would fare comparably poorly, but not 
worse. All other regions would be faring better.   4
Arab countries have been lacking behind in their ability to attract FDI relative to other 
developing countries since the late 1980s. Figure 1 shows that the ratio of developing 
country FDI inflows that went to Arab countries fell during the early 1990s. They 
only started to increase again very recently, post 2000, and did not yet reach the levels 
of the late 1980s. An interesting contrast to this pattern is that the share of developing 
country inflows going to African countries was higher than those flowing to Arab 
countries, and continuously increasing throughout this period (not shown). As average 
GDP growth of Arab countries and African countries has been comparable during this 
period, this conclusion is not an expression of diverging growth patterns. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 around here) 
 
The low FDI inflows have nevertheless resulted in a steady formation of FDI stock in 




Stylized Fact 3: FDI constitutes a relatively small part of overall investment in Arab 
countries 
FDI has contributed only little to the gross fixed capital formation of the Arab 
countries for which data were available. As shown in Table 3, the percentage of FDI 
inflows in gross fixed capital formation in Arab countries remains below the average 
for the world and for developing countries. Only three Arab countries’ contributions 
of FDI to gross fixed capital formation ranged above the developing country average 
between 1998 and 2003, namely Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. 
 
Given rather closed and poorly developed capital markets in the Arab world, and a 
consequently very small contribution of foreign as well as domestic portfolio direct 
investment, the bulk of Arab investments are financed domestically or intra-regionally 
through the domestic banking sectors. An overview of the distribution of domestic 
investment on sources of funds and types of investments is hard to provide for the 
Arab world, as disaggregate data on investment are scarce for this region. However, 
as the public sectors play an important role in Arab countries, and as shown by Sala-i-
Martin and Artadi (2002), the share of public sector funded investment is likely to be 
substantial. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Stylized Fact 4: Wide disparities in FDI inflows exist among Arab countries 
The FDI pattern summarized by Stylized Fact 2 above covers two diverging trends 
within the Arab region: the decrease in FDI inflows to oil-rich Gulf countries after the 
early 1980s, and the late onset of FDI inflows to the more diversified Arab countries. 
And these trends in turn cover more nuanced sub-regional patterns. Without going 
into detail
6, a characteristic feature of the sub grouping of economies based mainly on 
                                                 
5 UNCTAD (2004) 
6 See Eid and Paua (2003) for a more detailed description of the pattern of FDI flows to Arab countries, 
including an overview of sectoral distribution, countries of origin, and types of FDI flowing to this 
region.   5
oil-exports (henceforth referred to as the GCC countries)
7 is that FDI started to flow 
in early on, in the wake of the oil price booms of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Saudi Arabia in particular received large amounts of FDI during those years, and 
remains the country with the highest absolute concentration of FDI stock in the 
region. The subsequent drop in the oil prices during the late 1980s was accompanied 
by a decline in investment in some of the GCC countries. When looking at FDI stock 
relative to GDP, Bahrain emerges as the main recipient of inflows among the GCC 
countries over the last decade (72.4 percent). On the other hand, and unexpectedly, 
Kuwait and the UAE have been attracting relatively little FDI. FDI stock as a 
percentage of GDP for these two countries was the lowest in the Arab World in 2003
8. 
 
 (Insert Figure 2 around here) 
 
FDI has been highly volatile in GCC countries as compared to FDI inflows to the 
more diversified Arab countries (the non-GCC Arab countries
9), as shown in Figure 3. 
A typical feature of the more diversified economies is that FDI inflows only started to 
pick up relatively recently. By 2003, Morocco had received 93 percent of its FDI 
stock in the three preceding years alone, and Jordan more than 24 percent, whereas 
Egypt more than 80 percent as compared to the 1990 stock.
10 Relative to economic 
size, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco are the main destinations of FDI among the more 
diversified economies, both in terms of recent FDI inflows and in terms of FDI stock.  
 
Figure 2 shows that Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan are the only Arab countries which 
have been able to attract more of world FDI inflows than their share of world GDP. In 
common for these countries is that they have all been reforming economically, 
liberalizing trade and financial regimes and privatizing to some extent. Egypt was 
earlier part of this group, but has recently been falling behind in the reform process 
and has at the same time seen a relative decline in FDI inflows. Meanwhile, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia have been speeding up since 2000. 
 
Why is the FDI record of the Arab world so poor? Deterrents to FDI in the Arab 
world as a whole include historically high levels of restrictions on FDI, the 
traditionally large public sectors, and the associated limited room for private initiative. 
Moreover, since privatization has been one of the main factors driving FDI in 
developing countries in recent years, the slow pace of privatizations in the Arab 
region also provides part of the explanation for the low levels of FDI inflows there. 
But the poor FDI performance of the Arab world is hard to explain by these factors 
alone. Reasons should also be sought outside the traditional economic literature, in a 
region plagued with geopolitical tensions and instability. High political risk premiums 
associated with investment in this region are clearly hampering FDI inflows. 
 
                                                 
7 These countries are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and consist of Kuwait, Qatar, 
Bahrain, UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Iraq is not a member, and is only occasionally considered in 
this analysis due to a general lack of data. 
8 Source: UNCTAD (2004). It may come as a surprise to some that the UAE has received so little FDI. 
But the bulk of recent investments in Dubai in particular, have been financed domestically, with the 
extensive use of foreign labor and expertise. 
9 Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. The West Bank 
and Gaza is usually counted in this category, but has not been included here due to lack of data. 
10 UNCTAD (2004).   6
II.  Does FDI Contribute to Growth in the Arab World? 
The question naturally arises as to whether the poor FDI performance constitutes an 
impediment to growth in the Arab world compared to other developing regions with 
better FDI records, and whether stronger financial incentives to attract FDI thus 
should be implemented as part of a development strategy for Arab countries. The 
answer clearly must depend on whether FDI can reasonably be expected to contribute 
to growth over and above other types of investment. In order to shed light on this 
issue, we first give a brief introduction to the various hypothesized channels through 
which FDI may exhibit positive (or negative) externalities over and above other types 
of investment in Subsection i below. Subsection ii then look at the empirical evidence 
supporting these hypothesized externalities of FDI and their impact on growth, and 
takes these empirical results to the data for Arab countries, to see what these data 
imply for whether Arab countries are in a position to yield positive spillovers from 
FDI inflows. 
 
i.  The theoretical channels through which FDI affects growth 
Foreign direct investment can affect growth and development directly by contributing 
to gross fixed capital formation, and through several indirect channels which 
constitute the externalities associated with FDI. The direct channel does not favor FDI 
over other types of investment and would not in and of itself justify costly incentives 
for attracting FDI without providing the same incentives to domestic direct and 
foreign portfolio investment. Through the indirect channels, however, FDI is often 
argued to additionally affect various parts of the host economy, and in turn spur 
growth. We briefly introduce the main indirect channels below. 
 
Starting by what we call the crowding channel, FDI by a multinational corporation 
may trigger an additional need for financing which could be sought in domestic 
capital markets, in order to complement the initial foreign direct investment. The 
potential additional domestic portfolio financing can be a positive externality leading 
to crowding in, but may also have negative financial crowding out effects on domestic 
investments when the supply of domestic financial resources are scarce
11. Along the 
same lines, when FDI brings in a product already produced in the local market, the 
foreign affiliate enters into a competitive position with domestic industry and may 
crowd out some of the demand for local investment. Notwithstanding issues of 
efficiency and competition, this will in isolation have a negative impact on domestic 
gross fixed capital formation. The reverse case of crowding in can also be true in case 
the FDI introduces a new product into the host economy and creates a demand for 
locally produced intermediate goods which did not exist before. Finally, in the case of 
scarcity of skilled labor in the host country, FDI may also draw skilled labor away 
from domestic industries, which will then lead to a negative impact on domestically 
owned economic activities, in turn inducing additional negative crowding-out effects 
on local investment. Whether the crowding channel leads to a positive or a negative 
spillover can thus not be determined a priori
12. 
                                                 
11 If domestic investment which is crowded out is more productive than the investment which is 
replying it, then we have a negative crowding out effect. But the effect can obviously just as well be 
neutral or positive. 
12 Note here, that the crowding channel may also be at work for other types of investments, such as 
public, private domestic or foreign portfolio investments, but is usually argued to be likely to be 
stronger for FDI.   7
 
We refer to the second channel as the linkages channel. FDI may play an important 
role in transferring new technology to the host economy, which in turn may lead to 
higher productivity and growth. This positive spillover in principle comes about 
through outsourcing and through interaction of the multinational corporation with 
local suppliers and costumers, and by imitation of technology and know-how by local 
competing producers. Since a multinational will be interested in protecting its 
competitive edge among firms in the same industry, but has an interest in improving 
the efficiency and product quality of upstream suppliers, the linkages channel should 
be expected to work through backward linkages in particular, rather than through 
horizontal technology transfers or even forward linkages
13. 
 
The third and final channel is the human capital channel. FDI can have a positive 
impact on human capital development through the training and transfer of skills, 




The overall impact of FDI on the host economy hence depends on the relative 
quantitative importance of these potential spillovers. These three channels have more 
or less been the focus of the empirical literature presented below, and hence, these 
three channels will remain the focus of this paper. For the unambiguously positive 
linkages and human capital channels to work, a certain level of “absorptive capacity” 
of the host country in terms of level of technology of the host economy, educational 
level of the work force, level of infrastructure, financial and institutional 
development, etc., is now generally considered necessary. For example, a lack of 
financial development will prevent domestic and foreign firms from gaining financial 
resources for the desired technological upgrading which may be triggered by the 
linkages channel
15. Well functioning financial markets on the other hand will allow an 
efficient allocation of technology enhancing investments. Moreover, lack of sufficient 
schooling of the domestic work force may hinder the smooth transfer of skills from a 
multinational to the employees of downstream suppliers triggered by the human 
capital channel. The gap may simply be too wide to bridge. Thus, in lack of sufficient 
levels of absorptive capacity, and in cases where the crowding channel is negative, 
FDI may have a negative impact on growth in the host country. But if the level of 
absorptive capacity is sufficient for FDI to have positive spillovers through the 
linkages and skills channels, these latter channels may outweigh the crowding channel 
and lead to a positive impact of FDI on growth. In consequence, the benefit of 
attracting FDI to Arab countries cannot be determined by theory alone, but ultimately 
becomes an empirical question.  
 
ii.  The Empirical Evidence and Implications for Arab Countries 
Several empirical studies have been conducted with the aim of discerning the impact 
of FDI on host economies. These studies can be divided into two overall categories: 
                                                 
13 This is well argued in Javorcik (2004). 
14 A potential fourth channel often discussed is the market opening channel. Multinational corporations 
may give host economies access to new markets through its established trade relations. Increased 
exposure to global markets may, in the best of cases, give incentives to increase efficiency and 
competitiveness in host-economy exporting industries. The market opening channel has not been dealt 
with in the empirical literature, and will therefore not be taken into account further in the following. 
15 This argument is explained more carefully in Sadik and Bolbol (2003).   8
those looking for an overall, or unconditional, linear effect of FDI on growth by 
including FDI flows in growth, technology or productivity regressions; and the studies 
which assume that the impact of FDI on growth is non-linear and depends on 
absorptive capacity. These studies most often interact the FDI term with some 
selected component of absorptive capacity. Four such components of absorptive 
capacity have been the focus of the larger part of the studies in the latter category, 
namely the technology gap vis-à-vis some benchmark developed country, the level of 
skills and education of the workforce, the development of the financial sector, and 
finally, the institutional development of the host country. 
 
But before summarizing the main conclusions of each of these strains of the literature, 
and evaluating their implications for Arab countries, a few comments on their 
methodological framework are in place. Most of the studies suffer from exactly the 
same shortcomings as the general empirical literature on growth. This means that 
there are problems of endogeneity or potential joint determination of explanatory and 
dependent variables. We have not seen any convincing use of instruments as of yet. It 
should be kept in mind, however, that it is possible to dismiss a positive significant 
correlation between growth and FDI as a causal relationship going from growth to 
FDI, while it becomes more difficult to dismiss a negative significant correlation as 
such. Endogeneity is therefore difficult to use as an argument to dismiss the latter 
types of empirical findings of the impact of FDI on growth. It should also be noted 
that data on foreign direct investment flows as well as measures of absorptive capacity 
are poor, which is likely to be a major reason for the often found ambiguity or lack of 
significant correlations in these studies
16. Finally, while unconditional studies of the 
effect of FDI on growth have been done for Arab panels, there have to our knowledge 
not been any purely Arab country studies conditioning the effect of FDI on absorptive 
capacity so far. We hence base our analysis below on the results of broader 
developing country panel studies. 
 
a  Studies of the unconditional impact of FDI on growth 
Studies which have sought to estimate the unconditional effect of FDI on growth (or 
some component or indicator of growth) find ambiguous and not very stable results. 
Some studies find zero or even negative correlations between FDI and growth, while 
other studies find a significantly positive relationship. An example of the former type 
of study is van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) who conduct a 
panel regression analysis of growth in a broad panel of developing and developed 
countries. More interesting in the Arab world context is the study by Sadik and Bolbol 
(2001), who investigate the effect of FDI through technology spillovers on overall 
total factor productivity for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia 
over a 20-year period. They find that FDI has not had any manifest positive spillovers 
on technology and productivity over and above those of other types of capital 
formation. On the contrary, there are some indications that the effect of FDI on total 
factor productivity has been lower than domestic investments in some of the countries 
over the period studied, indicating a possibly dominating negative crowding out 
effect. 
 
                                                 
16 See for example Blomström and others (1994) for a discussion of data problems related to these 
types of studies.   9
But other studies find a positive unconditional effect of FDI on growth. Examples 
include and Blomström and others (1994)
17, Li and Lui (2005), and Haddad and 
Harrison (1993). The latter study uses industry level survey data on Moroccan firms 
to link the productivity of Moroccan firms with the firm specific degree of foreign 
ownership as well as the degree of foreign ownership of the sector to which the firm 
belongs. They find a higher overall level of productivity of firms with higher degree 
of foreign ownership, and also find that firms in sectors with a higher ratio of foreign 
ownership have higher levels of productivity, independently of the firm specific 
degree of foreign ownership. However, these results might just reflect that foreign 
direct investment flows to sectors and firms with higher overall productivity. Haddad 
and Harrison note that it is not possible to show that the presence of foreign direct 
investment should have accelerated the growth rate, and not just the level, of 
productivity in domestically owned firms in sectors with higher degree of foreign 
ownership. 
 
It thus seems that while there might be a level effect of FDI on GDP, the average 
Arab country has not in the recent past been benefiting from FDI inflows in terms of 
growth. But the results of the literature are ambiguous, and this ambiguity has recently 
been argued to be due to a misspecification of the estimating equation. More 
specifically, the relationship between FDI and growth is likely to be non-linear due to 
the role played by absorptive capacity in determining the sign and size of the impact. 
Many developing countries may in fact not have reached the necessary levels of 
absorptive capacity. And indeed, as we will see below, some studies have found that 
FDI affects growth only when a certain level of absorptive capacity is reached. 
 
b  Studies conditioning on absorptive capacity: the technology gap 
In addition to estimating the unconditional impact of FDI on growth, Blomström and 
others (1994) also study the FDI effect conditional on the technology gap of the host 
country. They do this by splitting their sample of developing countries into two 
halves, one sub sample of low income countries and one sub sample of not-so-low 
income countries, and find FDI to be growth enhancing only in the latter group. 
Blomström and others do not proceed to determine the exact threshold level of GDP 
however, and the marginal income level at which the two sub groups were split is not 
disclosed. More specific conclusions to this effect are reached by Li and Liu (2005), 
also mentioned above. Li and Lui look at the influence of the technology gap on the 
growth effects of FDI in developing countries, using the ratio of the gap between US 
GDP and host country GDP relative to host country GDP as proxy for the technology 
gap. They include FDI interacted with the proxy for the technology gap in their 
growth regression and find a significantly negative parameter estimate for this 
interaction term along with a positive parameter estimate for the pure FDI term. This 
is then taken to imply that the lower the level of technological development of the 
host country, the smaller (or more negative) is the impact of FDI on growth. The 
results imply a threshold value for the technology gap of 12.6, above which FDI is no 
longer beneficial for the recipient country.  
 
What does this mean for Arab countries? Taking the Li and Lui measure of the 
technology gap at face value (we will critique it below), this can be directly evaluated 
                                                 
17 But as Blomström and others (1994) split their sample countries into subgroups, the message 
becomes less clear, as we will return to below.   10
by comparing Arab countries appropriately measured output gaps with the mentioned 
threshold level found by Li and Lui (2005). Such technology gaps are given in Table 
4. Starting with the more diversified Arab countries in the top panel of the table, only 
two of these, Lebanon and Tunisia, stand out as being below the Li and Lui threshold 
and are likely to gain from FDI inflows according to their level of technology. The 
data also show that these two countries only started being able to gain in the mid 
1990s, prior to which they exceeded the threshold technology gap vis-à-vis the US. 
All other more diversified Arab countries are according to these estimations not in a 
position to gain from FDI inflows. In particular, Yemen and Sudan seem to have a 
substantial amount of technological upgrading to do before FDI should be considered 
as a means of further development. When turning to GCC countries in the second 
panel of Table 4, the picture looks very different, with all the countries figuring below 
the threshold level. All GCC countries should thus according to the Li and Liu 
estimations be in a position to be able to reap positive externalities from FDI 
inflows
18. Caution should be shown here in interpreting these results. GDP per capita 
might not be a good proxy for technological absorptive capacity, this might be 
particular the case in the context of Arab countries. Oil revenues in GCC countries 
account for a very large part of total GDP, but do not imply any particular level of 
technology. A similar point, but with the opposite implication, can be made for those 
of the more diversified economies which are highly dependent on transfers from 
abroad, such as Lebanon. The GNP of Lebanon is substantially greater than GDP due 
to large amounts of foreign earnings by the Lebanese expatriate community being 
transferred back to family members, and these transfers may also at least partly affect 
the level of technology in the country (implying that Lebanon might be even more in a 
position to gain from FDI than implied by the data). But devising a measure which 
adjusts properly for oil revenues or transfers from abroad is not straightforward. Non-
oil GDP per capita for GCC countries would not be correct, since the oil part is at 
least partly determining technology levels through available resources for the 
acquisition of technology. More research on how to account more appropriately for 
the technology gap in so-called rent economies is therefore warranted. 
 
(Insert Table 4 around here) 
 
c  Studies conditioning on absorptive capacity: Education of the workforce 
UNCTAD (1999) conducts an analysis of the impact of FDI on growth in developing 
countries, and finds that FDI is only significantly positive when entered in interaction 
with the number of years of schooling. Lu and Liu (2005) also find a positive 
interaction between years of schooling and FDI on the effect on growth, adding to an 
overall positive direct effect. Borensztein and others (1998) find more detailed results 
along the same lines. They study the growth effects of FDI inflows in a panel of 
developing countries and show that FDI does indeed contribute to economic growth 
over and above other forms of capital formation, but only when the effect is made 
conditional on the level of human capital development of the host country in question. 
More specifically, Borensztein and others find that FDI has a positive impact on 
                                                 
18 A little aside worth noting here is that the average technology gap for the Middle East and North 
Africa of 14.48 is just above, but nevertheless very close to the threshold level of 12.6, as opposed to 
the average for the Sub Saharan African region of 54.98. In the light of the Li and Liu estimations, this 
would imply that while the Sub Saharan African region attracts more FDI relative to their share of 
world GDP than the average Arab country, they are less likely to gain from these FDI inflows than 
Arab countries.   11
growth when the average years of secondary schooling of the male population above 
25 years of age exceeds the threshold of 0.52
19,20.  
 
What do these findings imply for the benefits of FDI in the Arab world? There are 
widespread differences when it comes to educational levels of Arab countries, and 
data on this is not widely available. Only for a small selection of Arab countries does 
data on average years of male secondary schooling exist. These data are listed in 
Table 5, and show that all Arab countries for which data are available have exceeded 
the threshold at least since 1980. The table also shows that the average level for Arab 
countries
21 exceeds the average for developing countries. While of the GCC countries 
only Kuwait and Bahrain were included in the sample, this conclusion is very likely to 
extend to the rest of the Gulf countries, where educational levels of nationals is rather 
high. It is more uncertain that Arab countries such as Yemen and Sudan, with lower 
levels of per capita income and development, have reached this threshold, but more 
detailed country specific information on the level of education in all Arab countries 
would be needed to make this calls.  
 
As is generally the case when using proxy measures as indicators of a specific aspect 
of development, a caveat is also in place here. As often pointed out in the literature, 
the average years of schooling is a measure of quantity rather than quality of 
education. Thus, for example, if a high fraction of secondary education in Arab 
countries is religious schooling exclusively, these statistics may not give an accurate 
picture of the level of absorptive capacity of FDI implied by the educational levels in 
the Arab world. Unfortunately, there are currently no good measures of the level of 
quality or content in education which could be compared across countries. Hence, 
country specific evaluations relying on sound judgment must be conducted when 
evaluating whether a given Arab country is currently likely to be able to benefit from 
skills transfers from FDI from more advanced countries. 
 
d  Studies conditioning on absorptive capacity: Financial  development 
Other studies have found indications that FDI may have a positive effect on growth 
when the host country’s financial market development has reached a certain degree of 
development. An example is Durham (2004), who studies the impact of FDI on 
growth in a broad panel of countries, investigating the interaction between FDI and a 
list of factors suspected of determining the level of absorptive capacity. The two 
factors which come out significant are financial sector development institutional 
development. We return to the latter below. Regarding the former, Durham measures 
financial market development by total stock market capitalization relative to GDP. 
Four Arab countries are included in the study, namely Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and 
Tunisia. According to his results, only Jordan scores high enough on stock market 
capitalization to potentially benefit from FDI though sufficiently developed financial 
markets. Since the four above mentioned Arab countries have some of the highest 
                                                 
19 As calculated using the formula given in Borensztein et al. (1998) based on data provided by Barro 
and Lee (2000). 
20 These results are not undisputed however. A more recent study by Durham (2004) (more extensively 
discussed below) repeats the exercise carried out by Borensztein and others using a different panel of 
countries and different years, and does not find any significant interaction term between level of 
education and FDI. 
21 This summary statistic is for Middle East and North African countries, and includes the data for Iran 
and Turkey in addition to Arab countries. It is taken directly from the Barro and Lee (2000) dataset.    12
stock market capitalizations of the Arab world, this means that according to this 
measure, no other Arab countries would have surpassed the threshold for sufficient 
financial market development to benefit from FDI
22. 
 
The financial sectors of Arab countries are highly bank based, so this conclusion is to 
be expected when using a market based measure of financial market development. 
And the conclusion does change when bank based financial sector development 
measures are used. For example, Hermes and Lensink (2003), also conducting a broad 
country panel study, find that a certain degree of host country development of the 
financial system, measured as domestic credit to the private sector provided by the 
banking sector, is an important prerequisite for FDI to have a positive effect on the 
host economy. Their results imply that domestic credit provided by the banking 
system should exceed 12 percent of GDP for the host country to be able to absorb the 
potential technology diffusion of FDI. Sadik and Bolbol (2003) carry out a similar 
analysis using only Arab countries in their panel data set, but investigating the 
implications of 4 different measures of financial sector development. They find that 
when the banking sector credit to the private sector is above 13 percent of GDP, FDI 
will start benefiting the host economy. 
 
What do these results imply for the level of absorptive capacity of Arab countries 
regarding financial market development? As a generalization, Arab countries are 
lacking behind other developing countries in terms of financial market development 
(see Sadik and Bolbol (2003) for a more detailed discussion), have relatively poorly 
developed financial markets, with credit to the private sector dominated by a 
fragmented and inefficient banking sector, and with not even a handful of countries 
with notable stock markets. As noted above, when stock market capitalization is used 
as a measure of financial development, only Jordan seems to be able to benefit from 
FDI. However, most Arab countries are found to currently exceed the threshold levels 
of financial sector development according to the bank based indicator. Table 6 shows 
data for domestic credit given by the banking sector for the Arab countries for which 
data was available. According to this measure, only Sudan and Yemen currently have 
insufficiently developed financial systems for the positive effects of the linkages 
channel to outweigh negative crowding effects of FDI.  
 
This leads to the tentative conclusion that Jordan seems to be financially sufficiently 
developed for benefiting from FDI inflows, while Sudan and Yemen are below the 
threshold of financial sector development. For all other Arab countries, the measured 
degree of financial sector development is highly sensitive to the measure used, and 
therefore difficult to firmly conclude on. Again, country specific studies of the 
development of the financial sector would be needed to make a call on it is 
sufficiently developed for allowing the absorption of positive FDI spillovers into the 
domestic economy. 
 
e  Studies conditioning on absorptive capacity: Institutional Development 
Returning to the study of Durham (2004), he additionally interacts the FDI term with 
institutional proxies, with very interesting results. He uses an index for the regulation 
of business, an index for the protection of property rights and an index of corruption 
                                                 
22 In fact, these countries plus Morocco are the only Arab countries for which stock market 
capitalization data is available, for the simple reason that stock markets are too recent and too 
insignificant in other countries to have available data accumulated. This is rapidly changing, however.   13
as institutional indices. The two former are found to significantly influence the impact 
of FDI on growth. More specifically, the business regulation index, which is discrete 
in nature and ranges from 1 to 4, is found to have a threshold value of just over 3, 
which implies that only four out of 32 countries in the sample pass the threshold. The 
property rights index is also discrete and takes on values from 1 to 5. This index is 
found to have a threshold value of just over 3, implying that 11 out of the 32 countries 
pass the threshold. 
 
The implications of these findings for whether Arab countries can expect to gain from 
FDI are not straightforward, due to lack of reliable data. The data used by Durham is 
not available for Arab countries, precluding a direct classification of Arab countries 
according to their institutional absorptive capacity
23. Moreover, we were not able to 
locate another good measure of protection of property rights which is comparable 
across countries. However, a measure of regulatory quality, which should be 
capturing some of the same features of Durham’s measure of business regulation, is 
available from the World Bank, and is shown in Table 7. In order to compare these 
data with Durham’s findings, we note that Durham finds four countries in his sample 
to pass the threshold for business regulation
24. Of these four, Argentina has the lowest 
score in the World Bank measure of regulatory quality, of –0.84 in 2002. Now, if we 
use this level of regulatory quality as a threshold level, above which countries should 
be in a position to reap positive externalities from FDI, we have a means of 
classifying Arab countries according to at least regulatory quality. According to this 
threshold, only three countries, Iraq, Libya and Syria, are found not to pass the 
threshold
25. All other Arab countries are found to have sufficiently high levels of 
regulatory quality to be in a position to gain from FDI. 
 
A warning is again in order. Measures of regulatory quality are fraught with 
imprecision, measurement error and bias, and furthermore, we have only been able to 
evaluate one little aspect of institutions, namely regulatory quality, for Arab countries. 
Clearly, more country specific research is called for.  
 
iii.  Summary: Implications of the empirical evidence for Arab Countries 
Three points emerge from the above survey of the findings of the empirical literature. 
First, the literature suggests that FDI in and of itself is no guarantee for stronger 
economic growth. In fact, FDI can have, and has occasionally been found to have, 
negative effects on growth in a host country due to negative crowding effects 
outweighing potentially positive externalities.  
 
Second, the Arab world as a group does not currently seem to be benefiting 
substantially from FDI, given the low level of current FDI and the findings of general 
Arab country studies not conditioning on absorptive capacity discussed under point a 
above. 
 
The third point is that given the substantial intra-regional differences between Arab 
countries, the general lack of positive externalities from FDI in the Arab world does 
                                                 
23 Some general and descriptive information on the state of business regulation and protection of 
property rights can be found in Alessandrini (2000). 
24 There countries were Argentina, Chile, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. 
25 The finding for Iraq is of course currently rather meaningless following the recent geopolitical 
developments there.   14
not preclude that some Arab countries may currently be benefiting from FDI, and that 
other Arab countries would be in a position to do so with small investments in 
absorptive capacity. Disregarding the findings for Iraq, the analysis of Arab country 
data conducted in this section implies that countries which may be currently 
benefiting include the GCC countries, plus Lebanon and Tunisia. All other Arab 
countries, on the account of at least one of the four types of absorptive capacity 
analyzed above, may not be currently gaining from FDI. In particular, Sudan, Syria 
and Yemen all fail on more than one of the four measures of absorptive capacity, 
implying that these three countries still have some way to go before being able to gain 
from attracting further FDI. But it is important to keep in mind that this conclusion is 
based on GDP data which may overestimate technology gaps due to oil revenues, 
education data which does not take into account quality of education, financial sector 
development data which assumes that banking sector credit is as relevant as stock 
market capitalization, and institutional data which only captures a small corner of 
institutional quality. More country-specific research on the impact of FDI in Arab 
countries is clearly called for to clarify which specific countries fall into which of 
these groups. It is in this respect important to keep in mind that cross country 
comparable data on different measures of absorptive capacity are scarce, and what is 
available is likely to be imprecise and potentially misleading. Country specific 
research may hence prove to yield the most interesting result if conducted on sector or 
industry levels using micro and survey data rather macro data. 
 
III.  Conclusions 
Arab countries receive only a small fraction of total FDI flows to developing 
countries, both in absolute terms and relative to GDP. Only Jordan, and very recently 
also Tunisia and Morocco, appear to have performed well above the average ratio as 
compared with the rest of the world in its ability to attract FDI. Moreover, FDI 
inflows to the Arab world have not increased during the 1990s, as has been the case 
for other developing regions, implying that the Arab world has been increasingly 
lagging behind in attracting FDI during the FDI boom years. This negative trend may 
be turning, however, as more diversified Arab economies seem to be able to 
increasingly attract FDI inflows. Finally, FDI to the Arab region contributes only very 
modestly to gross fixed capital formation in the region, as the overall build-up of 
capital formation continues to be mainly financed by domestic public and private 
funds. 
 
While a multitude of theories suggest that FDI may have a host of positive 
externalities that domestically financed investment does not posses, more recent 
research indicates that host countries need to have attained a certain level of 
absorptive capacity for the host country to be able to garner these positive 
externalities. Moreover, short of this level of absorptive capacity, FDI may even 
exhibit negative externalities. On this background, we have analyzed data on four 
different aspects of absorptive capacity – technology gaps, educational levels, 
financial sector development and institutional development – for Arab countries with 
the purpose of gaining some insight into whether Arab countries might be in a 
position to gain from FDI over and above domestically financed investment. A 
tentative result of this analysis is that other than GCC countries and possibly Lebanon 
and Tunisia, Arab countries are not likely to posses the absorptive capacity to gain 
from FDI. This conclusion is very sensitive to the absorptive capacity measures used,   15
however, and more country specific research is needed to establish more robust 
conclusions.  
 
But the analysis has made one point very clearly. There is absolutely no a-priori 
reason for Arab countries to expect the host of positive externalities that are usually 
argued to follow an increase in FDI inflows. There is hence no general economic 
rationale for implementing costly incentive schemes, such as tax holidays, investment 
subsidies, export credits and other measures, favoring FDI on behalf of domestically 
financed investment. On the contrary, such policies may reduce overall welfare by 
resulting in wasted political as well as economic resources if the country in question 
does not have a sufficient level of absorptive capacity. Rather, Arab countries would 
benefit from implementing policies to improve on their capacity to absorb FDI, such 
that more benefits may be reaped from existing and future FDI stocks. An upgrade of 
the human capital stock through an improvement in the quality and quantity of 
education, an improvement of the functioning of the financial sectors, a strengthening 
the quality of business regulation are all policies that fall into this category. In turn, 
countries with sufficiently high levels of absorptive capacity would only gain more 
from their existing and future FDI stocks and inflows. For countries below the 
threshold level of absorptive capacity, policies to upgrade this capacity are very likely 
to attract more FDI on their own account, but only at a time when FDI flows are more 
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Tables 
Table 1: FDI Inward Performance Index for Selected Regions 
   1988-1990  2001-2003 
World  1 1 
Developing Countries  0.99 1.25 
Latin America & the Caribbean  0.9 1.42 
Africa  0.7 1.16 
    North Africa  0.85  1 
Asia  1.09 1.19 
    South, East & South-East Asia  1.31 1.33 
    Central & Eastern Europe  1.04 1.35 
    West Asia  0.3  0.31 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004 
 
Table 2- Regional FDI Inflows, 1990-2001, millions of US Dollars 
   1990-1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
World 225.32 386.14 478.08 690.91 1'086.75 1'387.95 817.57 678.75 559.58
Africa 4.32 5.84 10.74 9.11 11.59 8.73 19.62 11.78 15.03
Latin America & the Carbbean  22.26 52.86 74.30 82.49 107.41 97.54 88.14 51.36 49.72
Asia 47.32 93.33 105.83 102.21 112.59 146.07 111.85 94.38 10.12
South, East & South-East Asia  44.56 87.84 96.34 92.14 109.12 142.68 102.23 86.33 96.92
Central & Eastern Europe  6.01 13.55 19.11 24.31 26.52 27.51 26.37 31.23 20.97
Arab Countries  2.80 3.60 7.37 9.67 3.28 4.33 10.76 5.87 8.33
Developing countries  74.29 152.69 191.02 194.06 231.88 252.46 219.72 157.61 172.03
Developing countries/World (%)  32.97% 39.54% 39.96% 28.09% 21.34% 18.19% 26.87% 23.22% 30.74%
Arab Countries/World (%)  1.24% 0.93% 1.54% 1.40% 0.30% 0.31% 1.32% 0.86% 1.49%
Arab/Developing count. (%)  3.77% 2.36% 3.86% 4.98% 1.41% 1.71% 4.90% 3.72% 4.84%
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, different issues  
 
















Saudi Arabia  0.80
Kuwait   0.13
Yemen -3.22
World 12.67
Developing Economies  12.48
Source: World Investment Report, 2004. UNCTAD 
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Table 4: Technology Gaps for selected Arab countries
 vis-à-vis the US
/a, Selected years between 
1990 and 2003 
   1990  1995  2000  2003 
          
More Diversified Arab Economies      
Algeria 14.86  17.62  18.75  17.57 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  25.92  25.80  25.08  24.60 
Jordan 16.36  16.28  18.75  18.47 
Lebanon  14.19  8.98  10.03  9.97 
Morocco 18.95  21.17  22.17  20.52 
Sudan 115.19  107.15  101.12  92.66 
Syrian Arab Republic  39.74  33.58  39.02  39.36 
Tunisia  13.34  12.80  11.85  11.11 
West Bank and Gaza  .. 17.49  21.00 36.93 
Yemen, Rep.  95.08  98.44  97.28  96.98 
        
GCC Countries      
Bahrain  2.12  1.73  1.85  .. 
United Arab Emirates  0.33  0.62  0.67  .. 
Saudi Arabia  2.34  2.54  3.07  .. 
Oman  3.68  3.89  4.36  .. 
Kuwait  ..  0.88  1.52  .. 
          
Selected Regions      
Middle East & North Africa  13.39  13.59  14.48  .. 
Sub-Saharan Africa  43.44  49.65  54.98  54.60 
Latin America & Caribbean  7.08  6.78  7.33  7.83 
Developed countries  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.06 
World  4.20  4.34  4.60  4.62 
Note: Countries in yellow are countries below the threshold in 2000.  
/a: The technology gap is computed as the difference between US GDP per capita and country specific 
GDP per capita as a ratio of country specific GDP per capita. All data are measured in constant US 
1995 dollars. Source: Own calculations based on data from World Development Indicators, 2004. The 
World Bank. 
 
Table 5: Average years of secondary schooling of male population above 25 for selected Arab 
countries
/a 
      1980  1990  2000
/b 
Selected Arab Countries:     
  Kuwait  1.18 1.71 2.00 
  Bahrain  1.00 1.12 1.59 
  Jordan  0.56 0.88 1.53 
  Egypt  0.36 0.74 1.13 
  Algeria  0.16 0.44 0.92 
  Syria  0.40 0.62 0.91 
  Tunisia  0.41 0.62 0.80 
  Iraq  0.27 0.63 0.79 
     Average  0.54  0.84  1.21 
Average All Arab Countries  0.10  0.50  0.70 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.33 0.44 0.75 
Latin America and the Caribbean  0.55  0.71  0.85 
South Asia  0.54   0.59   0.70    19
Developing  Countries  0.55 0.71 0.86 
Advanced  Economies  2.03 1.79 1.73 
World     1.2   1.3   1.2  
/a: Source: Own calculations according to formula used in Borensztein et al.(1998), based on data from 
Barro and Lee (2000). 
/b: Note that the numbers for 2000 are based on preliminary estimates 
 
Table 6 Financial depth: Domestic credit provided by banking sector  in % of GDP
/a  
   1990 1995 2000 2003 
      
More Diversified Arab Economies    
Algeria  74.5 48.7 31.9 35.2 
Egypt 106.8  81.8  99.5  117.2 
Jordan 117.9  93.2  89.3  90.3 
Lebanon 132.6  87.3  183.3  186.9 
Libya 104.1  108.4  57.8  .. 
Morocco  60.1 79.5 92.1 83.0 
Sudan 20.4  11.1  8.1  11.9 
Syria  56.6 48.1 25.9 30.0 
Tunisia  62.5 71.4 73.2 74.2 
Yemen 60.6  42.2  5.2  4.8 
      
GCC Countries      
Bahrain -1.0  42.6  48.1  .. 
Kuwait ..  103.6  83.9  .. 
Oman  16.6 29.2 36.9  .. 
Qatar  33.3 61.0 40.0  .. 
Saudi  Arabia  52.7 64.0 62.8  .. 
UAE  34.7 47.5 43.0  .. 
      
MENA  70.4 65.1 65.7 69.9 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  56.6 80.8 75.0 49.9 
South  Asia  48.8 43.5 51.1 54.6 
Latin America & Caribbean  59.0  39.6  39.6  45.6 
Europe & Central Asia  ..  32.0  35.3  38.0 
World  139.0 156.8 183.9 115.0 
/a: Source: World Development Indicators, 2004, World Bank. 
 
Table 7 Regulatory Quality for Arab countries, 2002
/a 
   Regulatory Quality 
  
More Diversified Arab Economies 
Algeria -0.54 
Egypt -0.45 
Iraq  -2.31 
Jordan 0.1 
Lebanon -0.47 
Libya  -1.59 
Morocco 0.02 
Syria  -0.97 
Tunisia -0.02 
Yemen -0.6   20
  





Saudi Arabia  0.08 
United Arab Emirates  0.97 
Note: Countries in yellow are countries below the threshold of –0.84 in 2002.  
/a. Source: Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 
1996-2002. World Bank Working Paper. Data available at 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/  
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Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2004)  
 
Figure 2. Country share in global FDI flows to the country’s share in global GDP (FDI 
performance index), average for 2000-2002 
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